Constituency fever in the Andes...

During the last few years, two countries in the Andean region, Bolivia and Ecuador, have lived important political changes. Most of these changes have occurred far from the institutional framework established for that purpose, and presidents in both countries have to, literally, flew away, incapable of achieving better conditions for their citizens even in front of economic dynamism (beside other causes, of course. It's always impossible to determine consider one single cause) .

Clientelism, corruption, and social deslegitimacy have been the main characteristics of the traditional political parties and the political system of representation (few years ago, at the IIG we published two interesting governance country profiles of both countries -in Spanish. Here for Bolivia, and here for Ecuador).

As a consequence, new political figures emerged. Both, Correa and Morales gained the top job claiming for the necessity to make deep changes in the "rules of the game" (be they related to the economic, the political and even the social arena). And this "sweeping behind the carpet" has its immediate translation in the calling of a Constituent Assembly to define and develop a new Constitution.

Both countries have in common different issues which one have to keep in mind when trying to guess the final consequences of these strategies:

- the extraordinary income inequality sustained in pervasive social pacts dating back from the colony (with critical consequences if we consider the institutional framework present in both countries, incapable of avoiding the translation of economic power into social and political power) - closely related, both countries are physically and geographically divided, with local and regional governments pledging for new duties and attributions (more power!)
- and finally, both countries have very demanded natural resources (to see my previous thoughts about the gas issue in Bolivia, have a look at this -in Spanish, though!)

I do think these countries need important institutional reforms. The actual institutional setting has disproportionally benefited a minority of the population (the rich ones). However, I do not think a great reform, such as the elaboration of a new Constitution, will achieve its pretended goal: solve all the numerous and deep rooted problems in these two countries. Not only the lack of consensus in the definition of this new Constitution, but also the lack of consensus in the procedures and steps to be taken are maintaining both countries in a permanent situation of social unrest. Furthermore, in the meantime as well, both countries are experiencing a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of their respective presidents. Given the multiple and divergent positions (i.e. polarization), it would be better to refind the consensus and "repair the holes, rather than starting to build a new house".

However, how to change the rules of the game when the rules to change them seem to be biased?